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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Affirmative action, which is defined as "the notion that the
government may utilize race and gender conscious programs to redress
the continuing effects of past discrimination in this country," 1 is a hot
topic in American higher education. The current affirmative action
controversy revolves around universities' use of race in their admissions
programs. 2 While supporters of affirmative action admissions programs
argue that affirmative action policies are designed to ensure diversity,
and thereby benefit all students, critics counter that such policies
unconstitutionally discriminate against white students. In 2003, the
United States Supreme Court considered both of these arguments in
Gratz v. Bollinger3 and Grutter v. Bollinger,' in which applicants to the
UnivPrsity of Michigan challenged the university's use of race in its
undergraduate and law school admissions programs. The opinions from
these two cases help to clarify how much weight, if any, colleges and
universities can give to a student's race, color, or ethnic background in
their admissions process.
American universities want to do more than merely provide their
students with an opportunity to master subjects or acquire skills. They
want their students to achieve a higher level of education that comes
from learning in an environment where "students come from very
different places, and with widely different notions ... , [with] much to
generalize, much to adjust, much to eliminate, [and] there are interrelations to be defined .... "5 Affirmative action admissions programs
are designed to achieve this higher level of education by attempting to
ensure that college classrooms are composed of students from diverse
backgrounds. While it is widely accepted that affirmative action

I. Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in the
Education Arena, 42 How. L). 451,451 (Spring 1999).

2. Mark R. Fletcher, A Talc o( Two Cases: Grutter, Gratz, and the Constitutional Limits of
Ajjirmative Action in Higher Education, 2002 L. Rev. M.S.ll.-D.C.L 965 (Winter 2002).
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
4.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).

5. John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, 130 (I.T. Ker ed., 1976).
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admissions programs help minority students by giving certain racial and
ethnic groups a boost in the admissions process, this comment explores
the issue of whether affirmative action programs also benefit nonminority students.
Part II of this comment sets the stage for the current affirmative
action debate by describing the constitutional and statutory grounds on
which non-minority students have challenged affirmative action
admissions programs. Part II also describes a key U. S. Supreme Court
decision, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 6 and its
Supreme Court and federal circuit court progeny. Part II concludes with
an analysis of Gratz and Grutter. Part III evaluates empirical data from
three recent studies to show that the use of affirmative action policies in
college admissions benefits both non-minority and minority students by
creating diversity on American campuses. Part IV considers affirmative
action alternatives that some states have used in the face of judicial
scrutiny. Finally, Part V addresses how affirmative action programs
benefit non-minority students because they create a diverse learning
environment where minority and non-minority students come together
to learn, exchange ideas, understand each other, and form opinions that
they will carry with them after they leave college.
II.

A.

A PFIRMATIVE ACTION BACKGROUND

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Opponents to affirmative action have challenged the use of race in
college admissions programs on the following grounds: ( 1) it violates the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Equal
Protection Clause"f which guarantees a citizen's right to the equal use of
public facilities without discrimination based on race; (2) it violates 42
U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981 ")x which ensures that all persons within the

6.
7.

Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 197S) (hereinafter Bakke).
See U.S. Con st. amend. XIV,§ I. Section one of the fourteenth Amendment reads:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the· privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
8. See42 U.S.C:. § 1981(a) (2003). Section 1981 reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall he subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exact ions of every kind, and to no other.
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U.S. will enjoy the same rights as are "enjoyed by white citizens;" (3) it
violates 42 U .S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") 9 which creates a civil action
against any person who deprives an individual of their civil rights under
color of state law; and (4) it violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VI") 10 which prohibits race based discrimination by any
organization receiving federal funds. 11
Together, these constitutional and statutory provisions prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, but do not
address preferential treatment on the same grounds. 12 Consequently, the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs, has been left entirely to
the courts. 13

B.
1.

Case Law

Prior Supreme Court Rulings

In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 14 the seminal
university admissions affirmative action case, the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the special admissions program used by the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis ("Davis"), which
allocated 16 out of 100 seats in each year's class to members of certain
minority groups, 15 violated the California Constitution, Title VI, and the
Equal Protection Clause. 1" The Supreme Court, without producing a
majority opinion, found that a public university could give some
consideration to race in its admissions process without violating the
Equal Protection Clause or Title Vl. 17 The Court also agreed with the
9.

Sec 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). Section 1983 reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights. privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable ..
10. Sec 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2003). This section, also known as Title VI, reads:
l\:o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
II. Sec e.g. Fletcher, supra n. 2 at 968.
12.

Sec id. at 969.

13. Sec id.
14.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.

15.

Id. at 265-66.

16.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 265.

17.
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California Supreme Court that Davis' use of a racial quota in its
admissions program was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
The problem with the five-to-four Bakke decision is that the nine
Justices disagreed on the complex issues presented by the case and,
consequently, no majority emerged to set guidelines for a permissible use
of racial preferences in college admissions. tx Justice Powell, writing for
the Court, included in his opinion that although Davis' race-based quota
system was unconstitutional, achieving a diverse student body is a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify the consideration of an
applicant's race in the admissions process. Specifically, Justice Powell
wrote that race can be used as a "plus" factor in admissions as long as there
is a compelling state interest to do so, 19 and that the goal of a diverse
student body constituted a compelling state interest. 20 However, no other
Justice expressly endorsed Powell's so called "diversity rationale." 2 '
In the wake of Bakke, the Supreme Court reiterated their holding
from Bakke that a strict scrutiny standard be applied to affirmative action
cases. 22 However, the Court was hesitant to clearly define what satisfied
the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Given the Court's failure to clarify its position on Justice Powell's
"diversity rationale," lower courts did their best to answer the question
on their own.
2.

Case Law from Federal Circuit Courts

Because of Bakke's failure to produce a majority opinion and the
apparent lack of support from other Justices for Justice Powell's
"diversity rationale," until the Supreme Court resolved the question in
Grutter and Gratz, lower federal circuit courts disagreed over the
question of whether the goal of obtaining a diverse student body satisfies
the "compelling governmental interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test.
For example, in Hopwood v. State ofTexas, 23 a white student who was
denied admission to the University of Texas School of Law brought suit

18. Id. at 320.
19. Id. at 318.
20. Id. at 311-12.
21. Id. at 328-421.
22. The strict scrutiny test consists of the following two prongs: (I) "any racial classification
'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest'" Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 274 (1986) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432 (1984)); and (2) "the means chosen by
the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."'
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S 448, 480 ( 1980)).
23. Hopwood v. St. of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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alleging that the school's admissions program, which considered the race
of applicants to ensure campus diversity, violated the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VU 4 The Fifth Circuit struck down Texas' admissions
program in its in entirety because: (1) Justice Powell's "diversity
rationale" in Bakke was merely the opinion of one Justice and, therefore,
"not binding precedent on the issue[;]" 25 and (2) there was no evidence
that the law school discriminated in the past. 26 The Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari because the challenged admissions
program no longer existed. 27
A few years later in Smith v. University of Washington Law Schoo/, 28
several students brought suit against the law school alleging that its
affirmative action admissions program, which ensured diversity, violated
Sections 1981 and 1983, and Title VU 9 In Smith, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that although no other Justice explicitly agreed with Powell's
opmwn, "educational diversity is [nonetheless] a compelling
governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny .... "30
To reach this conclusion, the court analyzed each of the concurring
opinions in Bakke and determined that Justice Powell's analysis was the
narrowest footing upon which a race conscious admissions program
could stand. It then applied the Marks v. United States 31 analysis, which
requires that "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in judgments on the narrowest
grounds[,]" to conclude that the rationale that Powell used in Bakke
represented the binding holding of the Court at the time. 32 The Ninth
Circuit then wrote that because the Supreme Court had not returned to
the question of the use of race in college admissions and had not
indicated that Powell's approach had lost its validity in this area, Justice
Powell's "diversity rationale" was a compelling state interest. 33 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion in this case. 34

24. I d. at 938.
25. I d. at 944.
26.

Id.

27. Tex. v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996).
28. Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
29. Jd.at119l.
30. Id. at 1200-0 I.
31. Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 ( 1977) (recognizing that "the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds"-which turns out to be justice Powell's opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n. 15 (1976)).
32. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199.
33. Jd. at 1200-0l.
34. Smith v. U. of Wash. Law Sch., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
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One year after Smith, in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University
of Georgia, 35 undergraduate students brought suit alleging that a racial
preference policy implemented by the University of Georgia in its
freshman admissions program "to foster student body diversity[,]" 16 was
unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit held that even if Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke was binding precedent, the University of Georgia's
admissions program still failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard and
was, therefore, unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling interest of fostering student body diversity. 37 The
University of Georgia decided not to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court.

3.

The Michigan Cases

The epitome of the Bakke split is found in two cases brought by nonminority applicants against the University of Michigan, which exemplify
conflicting
points
of view
surrounding
Justice
Powell's
suggestion/holding that the goal of campus diversity is a compelling state
interest. In these two cases, Gratz v. Bollinger3H and Grutter v. Bollinger,N
applicants to the university's undergraduate and law schools,
respectively, attempted "to determine the validity of racial classifications
in admissions programs at the same university. However, the holdings of
these two cases are very different: the Eastern District Court of Michigan
found one policy constitutional and found the other, similar program,
unconstitutional." 40

a.

Gratz v. Bollinger41

In Gratz, non-minority applicants brought suit against the University
of Michigan's undergraduate College of Literature, Science, and Arts
("LSA") alleging that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI
by utilizing a race conscious affirmative action program in admissions. 42
Looking to Bakke, the district court applied the strict scrutiny standard,u
and determined that the goal of creating a diverse student body was "a
35. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (lith Cir. 200 I).
36. Id. at 1239.
37. !d. at 1245.
38. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E. D. Mich. 2000).
39. Grutterv. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
40. Kathryne Raines, Student Author, The Diversity and Remedial Interests in University
Admissions Programs, 91 Ky. L.j. 255,270 (2002/2003).
41. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
42. ld. at 813-14.
43. !d. at 816 (quoting Ada rand Constr. Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (I 995) ).
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compelling governmental interest in the context of higher education
justifying the use of race as one factor in the admissions process." 44 The
district court also distinguished the LSA admissions program from the
admissions program at issue in Bakke in that the LSA program did not
employ a rigid quota system, which Justice Powell had found to be
impermissible in Bakke. 45 The court ultimately found that the LSA
admissions policy satisfied the Bakke requirements and was, therefore,
constitutional. 46

b.

Grutter v. Bollinger47

In Grutter, non-minority applicants brought suit against the
University of Michigan Law School alleging that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause, Title VI, and Section 1981 by using race as the
prevailing factor in its admissions process. 48 The applicants argued that
the use of race gave preferred minority applicants a much greater chance
of being admitted than non-minority and non-preferred minority
applicants with similar qualifications and, thus, violated the
Constitution.N On the other hand, the law school argued that "[b ]y
enrolling a critical mass of [underrepresented] minority students, the
Law School seeks to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to
the character of the Law School." 50 The law school defined "critical
mass" as "meaningful numbers, or meaning representation" or, more
specifically, as "numbers such that underrepresented minority students
do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race." 51
In stark contrast to the district court's decision in Gratz, the Grutter
district court elected not to follow Justice Powell's decision in Bakke when
it held that a diverse student body in the University of Michigan's Law
School is not a compelling governmental interest. 52 "As in Hopwood, the
Grutter [district] court believed that, due to the fragmented Bakke court,
the Bakke opinion 'did not hold that a state educational institution's desire
to assemble a racially diverse student body is a compelling government

44. Gratz, 122 1'. Supp. 2d at 820 n. 9 ("Recognizing that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Sixth Circuit have definitively held that diversity can never be a compelling interest under strict
scrutiny, this Court is satisfied that the University's [diversity rationale] argument remains viable.").
45. /d. at 827.
46. !d. at 831.
47. Gruffer, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
4X. !d. at 824.
49. !d.
50. Gruttcr, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
51. !d. at 2334-35.
52. Gruffer, 137 F. Supp. at 844.
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interest'." 53 Consequently, the Grutter district court granted plaintiffs
request for declaratory relief and enjoined the law school from using race
as a factor in its admissions decisions. 54
c.

Grutter and Gratz at the Sixth Circuit

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit heard oral arguments for Grutter and
Gratz simultaneously and delivered its decision on Grutter in the spring
of 2002. 55 The Sixth Circuit elected to answer the Gratz appeal at a later
date. Sitting en bane, the Sixth Circuit "reject[ed] the district court's
conclusion and [found] that the Law School [had] a compelling interest
in achieving a diverse student body" 56 because (1) it considered Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke as "binding on this court under Marks, 57 and
because Bakke remains the law until the Supreme Court instructs
otherwise[;]" 58 and (2) it found that "the Law School's use of race was
narrowly tailored because race was merely a potential plus factor .... "59
d.

Grutter and Gratz at the United States Supreme Court

On December 2, 2002, the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear Grutter and Gratz, "to resolve the disagreement among the Courts
of Appeals on a question of national importance-whether diversity is a
compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in
selecting applicants for admission to public universities." 60 Note that the
Supreme Court's decision to "consider the undergraduate case, Gratz v.
Bollinger, was highly unusual because the Sixth Circuit [had] yet to rule
on the lawsuit." 61
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court delivered decisions on the
issues identified in Grutter62 and Gratz. 63 In Grutter, Justice O'Connor,
writing for a five to four majority, "endorse[ d] Justice Powell's view that
53. Raines, 91 Ky. L.). at 273 (italics added) (quoting Bakke, 137 f. Supp. 2d at 844).
54. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
55. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
56. !d. at 739.
57. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
58. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739.
59. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335 (citing Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746-49) (quotation marks omitted).
60. !d. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002)(granting certiorari)).
61. Peter Schmidt & jeffrey Selin go, A Supreme Court Showdown, 49 Chron. of Higher Educ.
A20 (Dec. 13, 2002). "The Supreme Court's rules provide that the [)justices may hear a dispute
before a circuit-court ruling 'only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public
importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate
settlement in this court."' !d. at A26 (quoting28 U.S.C. § 210l(c) (2003)).
62. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
63. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2411.
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student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the
use of race in university admissions," 64 and consequently, held that the
law school has a compelling interest in attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented students, which "is necessary to further its compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body." 65
Justice O'Connor adopted the law school's "critical mass" standard as a
constitutional use of affirmative action in the admission of underrepresented
minority students because "critical mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce," not by reference
to the enrollment of "some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin ... [which] would amount to outright
racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional."66 Additionally, Justice
O'Connor wrote that since the law school "engages in a highly
individualized, holistic view of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment," 67 the law school properly uses race as a "plus"
factor, and the law school sufficiently considers workable race-neutral
alternatives. In conclusion, the Court held that "the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." 68
In Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six to three majority,
ruled against Michigan's undergraduate admission's policy, but only
because "the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every
single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that
respondents claim justifies their program." 69
The Grutter and Gratz decisions implicitly give more power to
Justice Powell's "diversity rationale" but do not resolve all of the
confusion generated by Bakke. As a result, a commentator recently
alleged that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court hardly ended the debate over
race-conscious college admissions policies," 70 and "these issues will have

64. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
65. !d. at 2341.
66. !d. at 2339 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
67. !d. at 2343.
68. Id. at 2347.
69. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
70. Peter Schmidt, Affirmative Action Survives, and So Does the Debate, 49 Chron. of Higher
Educ. Sl (July 4, 2003).
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to be fought out school by school and state by state." 71
Furthermore, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[a] core
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race ... [a]ccordingly,
race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time." 72 As a
result, Justice O'Connor wrote:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today. 73

Consequently, affirmative action programs in university admissions
have not escaped the strict scrutiny standard and, over time, race
conscious admissions programs will likely be struck down. However, the
"diversity rationale" presented by Justice Powell in Bakke and approved
by the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz must endure the test of time
if universities want to create, or maintain, a learning environment where
minority and non-minority students come together to learn, exchange
ideas, understand each other, and form opinions that they will carry with
them after they leave college. Ensuing debates over affirmative action
programs in university admissions will undoubtedly include discussions
about the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs and empirical
evidence regarding the claim that both minority and non-minority
students benefit from affirmative action policies.
Therefore, this
comment includes an analysis of affirmative action beneficiaries.

III.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BENEFICIARIES

Kristy Downing, a female African-American law student, is
considered by many to be the face of affirmative action at the University
of Michigan. 74 While she realizes that many of her peers see her as just
another beneficiary of an affirmative action quota system, Downing
maintains that: "[p]eople who didn't want African-Americans to succeed
in the first place will always see me as just an African-American. There's
nothing I can do to please them except feel bad about myself. It's not
71. Id. (quoting Roger B. Clegg, general counsel for the Center for Equal Opportunity, which
is a group that opposes race-conscious admissions policies).
72. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 2346-47 (citations omitted).
74. Richard Morgan, At Michigan, Beneficiary of Affirmative Action Is Proud to Dc(cnd It, 49
Chron. of Higher Educ. A22 (Dec. 13, 2002).
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that they're racist-they just don't speak from a perspective that includes
Downing's presence in the classroom and the
opinions that she expresses from the perspective of an African-American
woman are precisely why increased racial and ethnic diversity enhance
the university learning experience to the benefit of both minority and
non-minority students.
Notwithstanding, judges have become increasingly skeptical about
the theoretical benefits of diversity in higher education. 76 To counter
this, universities have been forced to produce strong empirical evidence
that "demonstrates the positive educational value of diversity." 77 For this
reason, the following three objective studies are discussed to support the
argument that both minority and non-minority students are beneficiaries
of diverse learning environments.n
other viewpoints." 75

A.

The Bok and Bowen Stud/Y

The first of these studies, compiled by Derek Bok and William
Bowen/ 0 considered and analyzed the experiences of tens of thousands of
minority and non-minority students who entered twenty-eight of the
nation's most prestigious universities in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989.x 1
According to the study's preface, Bok and Bowen set out to provide
"empirical evidence as to the effects of [race-sensitive admissions]
policies and their consequences for the students involved."R 2
The study asked students questions about the admissions process,
their experience of studying on a diverse campus, their overall college
experience, and their post-college family and social experiences. After
analyzing the responses, Bok and Bowen made the following
observations: First, "[o]f the blacks who entered selective colleges in
1989, 88 percent report[ed] having known well two or more white
classmates, while 56 percent of their white classmates say that they knew
at least two black classmates well."R 3 Second, as a rule, students who had
extensive interaction with a diverse student body tended to maintain

75.

/d. (emphasis added).

See Mark. R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the
\!ulues ofA}{irmutivc Action, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1333 (Dec. 1999).
77. Td.
78. !d. at 1326.
79. See id. (citing Derek Bok & William <;. Bowen, The Shape of the River: Long- Term
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton U. Press 1998)).
80. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1326.
Hl. See id.; See Derek Bok & William C. Bowen, Access to Success, 85 ABA). 62 ( 1999).
82. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1326 (quoting Rok, 85 ABA). at xxiv).
83. Bok, supra n. 81 at 63.
76.
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similar interactions with diverse groups after college as well.x 4 Third,
regarding post-college family and social experiences, white graduates of
the selected institutions achieved meaningful employment, high
earnings, considerable job satisfaction, and high levels of civic
participation and satisfaction with life.x 5 Fourth, "[a]lmost 80% of white
graduates favor[ ed] retaining their school's current emphasis on diversity
or emphasizing it even more."R 6
B.

The Gurin Stud/ 7

The second study, compiled' by Professor Patricia Gurin of the
University of Michigan, was conducted as part of the University's efforts
to defend its admissions policies in the Grutter and Gratz litigation and
to the general public.xx
Using national and Michigan databases, the Gurin study, which is
alleged to be one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses ever
performed,H9 provides empirical evidence that diversity in higher
education benefits both non-minority and minority students. 90
Specifically, it identifies three ways that students benefit from learning in
a diverse learning environment. First, "[s]tudents learn more and think
in deeper, more complex ways in a diverse educational environment." 91
Second, the study shows that "[s]tudents educated in diverse settings are
more motivated and betler able to participate in an increasingly
heterogeneous and complex democracy." 92 Third, "patterns of racial
segregation and separation historically rooted in our national life can be
broken by diversity experiences in higher education."93

!d.
85. Bok, supra n. 79 at 118-92.

84.

86. Jd.at193-217.
87. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1327; See Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin
<http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc> (last updated Sept. 4, 2003).
88. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1327.
89. Gurin, supra n. 87 at <http://www.umich.edu/-urcl/admissions/lcgal/expcrt/info. html>.
90. Gurin, supra n. 87 at <http://www.umich.edu/-urcl/admissions/lcgal/expcrt/summ. html>.
91. Jd.
92. Jd.
93. !d.
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The Orfield and Whitla Study 94

The third study, compiled by Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla,
analyzed "a narrower and potentially more significant question, the effect
of a diverse learning environment on students enrolled in what the study
aptly characterizes as 'leading law schools."' 95 This study is significant in
that it attempts to provide empirical evidence to support Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke that diversity is a compelling government interest and,
therefore, a justification for race-conscious admission policies. 96
By means of a Gallup Poll administered at Harvard and Michigan
Law Schools, the study considered the impact of diversity by asking law
students how it has influenced their educational experiences. 97 The
findings include the following: First, "large majorities have experienced
powerful educational experiences from interaction with students of other
races." 9 x Second, "[w]hite students appear to have a particularly
enriching experience, since they are by far the most likely to have grown
up with little interracial contact."99 Ultimately, this study provides strong
evidence for the conclusion that "[t]he values affirmed by Justice
Powell ... in the Bakke decision appear to be operating in the lives of law
students today" because "most of today's students find [diversity] so
beneficial to their legal education and to understanding critical
dimensions of their profession. " 100
The empirical evidence generated by the aforementioned studies is of
paramount importance because it supports a conclusion that diversity,
achieved through race-conscious admissions programs, benefits both
minority and non-minority students. These findings support the
retention of admissions programs that increase diversity on university
campuses because abandonment of such policies would harm not only
those minority students who would otherwise be denied admission if race
conscious admissions policies were eliminated, but also, as these studies
demonstrate, the non-minority students who would take their places.

94. Killenbeck, supra n. 76 at 1329 (citing Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal
Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools <http:/ /www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/
The Orfield and Whitla Study has been moved to <http:/ I
publications/lawsurvey.html> ).
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/lawmichigan/DiversityandLegalEducation.pdf> (last updated
Aug. 1999).
95. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1329.
96. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
97. Killen beck, supra n. 76 at 1331 (citing Orfield, supra n. 94 at 143).
98. Orfield, supra n. 94 at 172.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ALTERNATIVES

Because the use of affirmative action programs in university
admissions is still required to satisfy a strict scrutiny standard and, in
some cases, may not survive such scrutiny, this section analyzes two
affirmative action alternatives.
A.

Do Nothing

Proponents of the "do nothing" alternative maintain "that blacks
should, metaphorically, pull up their socks and get about the business of
doing as well as whites do on tests." 101 This argument is based on the
premise that the challenge of having no preferential treatment will
inspire minority students to score better on admissions test. This
argument is countered by Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, an expert quoted in
Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion, who testified that:
[A] race-blind admissions system would have a 'very dramatic,'
negative effect on the underrepresented minority admissions .... [I]n
2000, 35 percent of underrepresented minority applicants were
admitted . . . if race were not considered, only 10 percent of those
applicants would have been admitted....
Under this scenario,
underrepresented minority students would have comprised 4 percent of
the entering class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent. 102

B.

Statutory Alternatives to Affirmative Action Programs
in University Admissions

Texas recently elected to ban affirmative action policies that the Fifth
Circuit found unconstitutional in H opwood. 103 The state enacted two
alternative programs in an effort to retain diversity in its institutions of
higher education. The first Texas statute, titled "Automatic Admission:
All Institutions," provides that "each institution in the [state's] higher
education system 'shall admit an applicant . . . as an undergraduate
student if the applicant graduated with a grade point average (GPA) in
the top 10% of the student's high school graduating class in one of the
two school years' preceding the year for which the applicant is applying
for admission." 104 The second statute, titled "Other Admissions,"
provides for applicants who are not in the top 10% of their high school

101. See jack Greenberg, Ajjirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition
and Theory, 43 Il.C:. L. Rev. 521,547 (May 2002).
102. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
!03. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
104. c;reenberg, supra n. 101 at 538 (qtwtingTex. Educ. Code Ann.§ 51.803(a) (2002)).
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class by stating that '"[b ]ecause of changing demographic trends,
diversity, and population increases in the state,' in addition to academic
achievement, schools 'shall also consider' any or a combination of
'socioeconomic' factors." 105 As a result of these two "alternative-toaffirmative-action" statutes, the University of Texas was able to restore its
undergraduate black admission numbers to pre- Hopwood levels. 106
However, it should be noted that the automatic admissions programs
described above cannot work for professional programs and,
consequently, the University of Texas law school's minority enrollment is
well below pre- Hopwood levels. 107
California also banned the use of affirmative action programs in
university admissions. 108 In an attempt to preserve diversity in the state's
institutions of higher education, California enacted a top percentage plan
similar to the one adopted in Texas, but capped it at 4 percent as opposed
to Texas' 10 percent. The California statute has produced dismal results.
"Overall, in 2000 and 2001, the number of black students enrolling for
the first time at the university's undergraduate colleges stabilized at about
20% below the level at which it had been under affirmative action." 109
The state has yet to remedy this problem.
V.

CONCLUSION

For decades Federal circuit courts have grappled over the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs in university admissions.
Then, in Grutter and Gratz, the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly gave more
power to Justice Powell's "diversity rationale." As a result, affirmative
action supporters thought that the debate had been settled once and for
all. However, critics allege that the U.S. Supreme Court did not resolve
the issue and that it will continue to be fought out school by school and
state by state. Consequently, this paper concludes that Justice Powell's
diversity rationale satisfies the compelling governmental interest prong
of the strict scrutiny test because empirical evidence shows that
affirmative action programs benefit minority and non-minority students
105. Id. at 539 (quoting Tex. Educ. Code Ann.§ 51.805(b) (2002) (the statute includes a list of
18 factors that may be considered in the admission process)).
106. Id. at 539.
I 07. Id. at 540.
108. Id. at 541. Proposition 209, which banned the use of affirmative action in university
admissions, was enacted in 1996. Proposition 209 states: "The state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." Cal.
Con st. art. 1, § 31, cl. a.

109. Greenberg, supra n. 101 at 541.
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by creating a diverse learning environment where minority and nonminority students come together to learn, exchange ideas, understand
each other, and form opinions that they will carry with them after they
leave college. Furthermore, this paper concludes that non-affirmative
action alternatives should be considered if affirmative action programs
are found to be unconstitutional and the compelling interest of a diverse
student body is not satisfied.
]eramy R. Green*
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